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Abstract
The GAI (Generalized Additive Independence) model proposed by Fishburn is
a generalization of the additive utility model, which need not satisfy mutual prefer-
ential independence. Its great generality makes however its application and study
difficult. We consider a significant subclass of GAI models, namely the discrete
2-additive GAI models, and provide for this class a decomposition into nonneg-
ative monotone terms. This decomposition allows a reduction from exponential
to quadratic complexity in any optimization problem involving discrete 2-additive
models, making them usable in practice.
Subject classification: Utility: multiattribute. Decision Analysis: multiple criteria.
Games/group decisions: cooperative.
Area of review: Decision Analysis
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1 Introduction
The theory of multiattribute utility (MAUT) provides an adequate and widely studied
framework for the representation of preferences in decision making with multiple objec-
tives or criteria (let us mention here only the classic works of Keeney and Raiﬀa (1976),
and Krantz et al. (1971) on conjoint measurement, among numerous other ones). The
most representative models in MAUT are the additive utility model U(x) =
∑
i ui(xi),
and the multilinear model (see Dyer and Sarin (1979)), whose characteristic property is
the (mutual) preferential independence, stipulating that the preference among two alter-
natives should not depend on the attributes where the two alternatives agree (see Abbas
and Sun (2015) for a detailed study on MAUT models satisfying preferential indepen-
dence).
However, it is well known that in real situations, preferential independence could be
easily violated, because of the possible interaction between objective/criteria. Referring
to the example of evaluation of students in Grabisch (1996) where students are eval-
uated on three subjects like mathematics, physics and language skills, the preference
between two students may be inverted depending on their level in mathematics, assum-
ing that the evaluation policy pays attention to scientiﬁc subjects. For instance, the
following preference reversal is not unlikely (marks are given on a 0-100 scale, in the
following order: mathematics, physics and language skills): (40, 90, 60) ≻ (40, 60, 90) and
(80, 90, 60) ≺ (80, 60, 90), because if a student is weak in one of the scientiﬁc subject (e.g.,
40 in mathematics), more attention is paid to the other scientiﬁc subject (here, physics),
otherwise more attention is paid to language skills.
To escape preferential independence, Krantz et al. (1971) have proposed the so-called
decomposable model, of the form U(x) = F (u1(x1), . . . , un(xn)), where F is strictly mono-
tone. This model, which is a generalization of the additive utility model, is characterized
by a much weaker property than preferential independence, namely weak independence
or weak separability (Wakker (1989)). This property amounts to requiring preferential
independence only for one attribute versus the others, and is generally satisﬁed in prac-
tice. Taking F as the Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity (Choquet (1953)) permits to
have a versatile model, which has been well studied and applied in practice (see a survey
in Grabisch and Labreuche (2010)). The drawback of these models is that in general they
require commensurate utility functions, i.e., one should be able to compare ui(xi) with
uj(xj) for every distinct i, j.
Another generalization of the additive utility model escaping preferential indepen-
dence has been proposed by Fishburn (1967), under the name of generalized additive
independence (GAI) model. It has the general form U(x) =
∑
S∈S uS(xS), where S is
any collection of subsets of attributes, and xS is the vector of components of x belonging
to S. This model is very general (it even need not satisfy weak independence, see below
for an example) and does not need commensurate attributes.
Its great generality is also the Achille’s heel of this model, making it diﬃcult to use in
practice, and so far it has not been so much considered in the MAUT community. Some
developments, essentially focused on the identiﬁcation of the parameters of the model,
have been done in the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence (see, e.g., Bacchus and Grove (1995);
Boutilier et al. (2001); Bigot et al. (2012)).
The aim of this paper is to provide a ﬁrst step in making GAI models usable in
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practice, by proving a fundamental result on decomposition, in a subclass of GAI models
which is signiﬁcant for applications. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in GAI models where,
ﬁrst, the collection S is made only of singletons and pairs, thus limiting the model to a
sum of univariate or bivariate terms, and second, the attributes take discrete values. We
call this particular class 2-additive discrete GAI models.
Even restricting to this particular class, the practical identiﬁcation of the model ap-
pears to be rapidly computationally intractable as the number of attributes and the
cardinality of the attributes grow. Indeed, U being monotone nondecreasing, the number
of monotonicity constraints on the parameters of the model grows exponentially fast in
the number of attributes.
We show that by an adequate decomposition of the model, the complexity is reduced
to be quadratic in the number of attributes. Indeed, for a given 2-additive GAI model,
there exist several decompositions, i.e., several ways to express it as a sum of univariate
and bivariate terms. We show that it is always possible to obtain a decomposition into
nonnegative monotone nondecreasing terms, which considerably reduces the number of
monotonicity constraints. The result is proved by using an equivalence between 2-additive
discrete GAI models and 2-additive k-ary capacities, and amounts to ﬁnding the set of
extreme points of the polytope of 2-additive k-ary capacities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary concepts and
notation in multiattribute utility, capacities, k-ary capacities, and GAI models. Section 3
introduces p-additive GAI models, and shows the equivalence with p-additive k-ary ca-
pacities. Section 4 explains the complexity problem behind the identiﬁcation of 2-additive
discrete GAI models, and proves that a decomposition into nonnegative monotone non-
decreasing terms is always possible, which constitutes the main result of the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
We consider n attributes X1, . . . , Xn, letting N = {1, . . . , n} be its index set. Alternatives
are represented by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) in X = X1 × · · · × Xn. We denote by
(xA, y−A) ∈ X the compound alternative taking value xi if i ∈ A and value yi otherwise.
One of the leading model in decision theory is Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (Keeney
and Raiﬀa, 1976). The overall utility U : X → R representing the preference relation <
of a decision maker (i.e. x < y iﬀ U(x) ≥ U(y)) is then supposed to satisfy preferential
independence, whereby the comparison between two alternatives does not depend on the
attributes having the same value. Accordingly, U can take the form of either an additive
model U(x) =
∑
i∈N ki ui(xi), or a multilinear form 1 − k U(x) =
∏
i∈N(1 − k ki ui(xi)),
where ui is a marginal utility function over attribute Xi.
As we explained in the introduction, preferential independence is a quite strong con-
dition which is not always met in practice. A weaker condition is weak independence
where for all i ∈ N , all xi, yi ∈ Xi and all z−i, t−i ∈ X−i
(xi, z−i) < (yi, z−i) ⇐⇒ (xi, t−i) < (yi, t−i)
(xi is at least as good as yi ceteris paribus). Under this condition, we can deﬁne a
3
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preference relation <i on a single attribute Xi as follows: for all xi, yi ∈ Xi
xi <i yi iﬀ (xi, z−i) < (yi, z−i),
for some z−i ∈ X−i.
2.2 Generalized Additive Independence (GAI) model
The additive utility model
∑
i∈N ui(xi) can be easily generalized by considering marginal
utility functions over subsets of attributes, with potential overlap between the subsets
(Fishburn, 1967; Bacchus and Grove, 1995):
U(x) =
∑
S∈S
uS(xS) (x ∈ X), (1)
where S ⊆ 2N \ {∅}. This model is called the Generalized Additive Independence (GAI)
model. It is characterized by a condition stating that if two probability distributions
P and Q over the alternatives X have the same marginals over every S ∈ S, then the
expected utility of P and Q are equal.
Unlike the additive utility model or the multilinear model, the GAI model does
not necessarily satisfy weak independence. In the Artiﬁcial Intelligence community, re-
searchers are interested in the representation of preferences that may violate weak in-
dependence. A well-known example of such a preference is the following: consider two
attributes X1, X2 where X1 pertains on the type of wine and X2 to the type of main
course in a restaurant. Then usually, one prefers ‘red wine’ to ‘white wine’ if the main
course is ‘meat’, but ‘white wine’ is preferred to ‘red wine’ if the main course is ‘ﬁsh’ (the
preference over attribute ‘wine’ is conditional on the value on attribute ‘main course’)
(Boutilier et al., 2001).
In this work, we follow a more traditional view of Decision Theory and assume that
weak independence holds, which is the case in most of the decision problems.
We make the following two assumptions:
• Assumption 1: Monotonicity:
∀i ∈ N, xi <i yi ⇒ U(x) ≥ U(y)
• Assumption 2: Boundaries: each Xi is bounded, in the sense that there exist
x⊤i , x
⊥
i ∈ Xi which are the best and worst elements of Xi according to <i, and
U(x⊤i , . . . , x
⊤
n ) = 1, U(x
⊥
i , . . . , x
⊥
n ) = 0.
2.3 Capacities and k-ary capacities
We consider a ﬁnite set N = {1, . . . , n} (e.g., the index set of attributes as in Section 2.1).
A game on N is a set function v : 2N → R vanishing on the empty set. A game v is
monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . Note that monotone games take nonnegative
values, and if in addition v(N) = 1, the game is said to be normalized. In the sequel,
4
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we will mainly deal with monotone normalized games, which are usually called capacities
(Choquet, 1953)1.
Making the identiﬁcation of sets with their characteristic functions, i.e., S ↔ 1S for
any S ∈ 2N , with 1S : N → {0, 1}, 1S(i) = 1 iﬀ i ∈ S, games can be seen as functions on
the set of binary functions. A natural generalization is then to consider functions taking
values in {0, 1, . . . , k}, leading to the so-called multichoice or k-choice games (Hsiao and
Raghavan, 1990) and k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003). Formally, a k-
choice game is a mapping v : {0, 1, . . . , k}N → R satisfying v(0, . . . , 0) = 0. A k-ary
capacity is a k-choice game being monotone and normalized, i.e., satisfying v(y) ≤ v(z)
whenever y ≤ z, and v(k, . . . , k) = 1.
Let v : 2N → R be a game. The Mo¨bius transform of v (a.k.a. Mo¨bius inverse) is the
set function mv : 2N → R which is the (unique) solution of the linear system
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
mv(T ) (S ∈ 2N)
(see Rota (1964)). It is given by
mv(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |v(T ) (S ∈ 2N). (2)
A capacity v is said to be (at most) p-additive for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n} if its Mo¨bius
transform vanishes for subsets of more than p elements: mv(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N such
that |S| > p.
Similarly, given a k-ary game v, its Mo¨bius transform is deﬁned as the unique solution
of the linear system
v(z) =
∑
y≤z
mv(y) (z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N). (3)
It is shown in the appendix that its solution is given by
mv(z) =
∑
y≤z : zi−yi≤1∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N (zi−yi)v(y) (z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N). (4)
It follows that any k-ary game v can be written as:
v =
∑
x∈LN
mv(x)ux,
with ux a k-ary capacity deﬁned by
ux(z) =
{
1, if z ≥ x
0, otherwise.
By analogy with classical games, ux is called the unanimity game centered on x. Note
that this decomposition is unique as the unanimity games are linearly independent, and
form a basis of the vector space of k-ary games.
1Often capacities are defined as monotone games, not necessarily normalized.
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3 Relation between GAI and k-ary capacities
3.1 Discrete GAI models are k-ary capacities
We consider discrete GAI models, i.e., where attributes can take only a ﬁnite number of
values, and show that they are particular instances of k-ary capacities. We put
Xi = {a
0
i , . . . , a
mi
i } (i ∈ N),
with a0i 4i · · · 4i a
mi
i . Any alternative x ∈ X is mapped to {0, . . . , m1}×· · ·×{0, . . . , mn}
by the mapping ϕ which simply keeps track of the rank of the value of the attribute:
(aj11 , . . . , a
jn
n ) 7→ ϕ(a
j1
1 , . . . , a
jn
n ) = (j1, . . . , jn).
We consider now the smallest (discrete) hypercube {0, . . . , k}N containing {0, . . . , m1}×
· · · × {0, . . . , mn}, with k := maximi. Given a GAI model U with discrete attributes as
described above, we deﬁne the mapping v : {0, . . . , k}N → R by
U(x) =: v(ϕ(x)) (x ∈ X)
and let v(z) := v(m1, . . . , mn) when z ∈ {0, . . . , k}
N \ ϕ(X). In words, v encodes the
values of U for every alternative, and ﬁlls in the missing values in the hypercube by the
maximum of U . By assumption 1 and 2 on U , it follows that v is a normalized k-ary
capacity on N .
From now on, we put L = {0, 1, . . . , k}.
3.2 p-additive GAI models
Consider a GAI model U on X , where the attributes need not be discrete. As U is
in general exponentially complex in the number of attributes, one is looking for simple
particular cases. The simplest case would be to consider a classical additive model. The
characteristic property of an additive model is that the variation of U in one attribute is
unrelated to the value of the other ﬁxed ones:
U(yi, x−i)− U(xi, x−i) = u{i}(yi)− u{i}(xi).
Calling the left member the (1st order) variation of U w.r.t. i from xi to yi at x, we
deﬁne inductively the variation of U w.r.t. P ⊆ N from xP to yP at x by
∆yPxPU(x) =
∑
T⊆P
(−1)|P\T |U(yT , xP\T , x−P )
For example, one has, abbreviating {i, j} by ij:
∆yixiU(x) = U(yi, x−i)− U(xi, x−i)
∆yijxijU(x) = U(yij , x−ij)− U(xi, yj, x−ij)− U(yi, xj , x−ij) + U(x).
Definition 1. A function U on X is said to be p-additive for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n} if for
every P ⊆ N with |P | ≤ p, for every x ∈ X , xP , yP ∈ XP and x
′
−P ∈ X−P ,
∆yPxPU(xP , x−P ) = ∆
yP
xP
U(xP , x
′
−P ).
6
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The above deﬁnition generalizes the notion of 2-additivity proposed in Labreuche and
Grabisch (2013).
The next theorem relates p-additivity to the decomposition of U into terms involving
at most p variables, and generalizes (Labreuche and Grabisch, 2013, Prop. 4).
Theorem 1. A function U on X is p-additive for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n} if and only if there
exist functions uA : XA → R, for every A ⊆ N with |A| ≤ p, such that U takes the form
(1) with S = {A ⊆ N, 0 < |A| ≤ p}.
Proof. We suppose p 6= n to discard the trivial case. The “if” part is easy to check.
As for the “only if” part, ﬁx x ∈ X and deﬁne v(A) = U(xA, 0−A) for all A ⊆ N . By
assumptions 1 and 2, v is a (non-normalized) capacity on N . Deﬁne its discrete derivative
inductively as follows. For any ∅ 6= S ⊂ N , T ∈ 2N and i 6∈ S,
∆S∪iv(T ) = ∆i(∆Sv(T ))
with ∆iv(T ) = v(T ∪ i)− v(T ). Then it is easy to see by (2) that ∆Sv(∅) = m
v(S), and
that for disjoint S and T
∆Sv(T ) = ∆
xS
0S
U(xT , 0−T ).
Take S such that |S| = p and any i ∈ N \ S. Then for any T ⊆ N \ (S ∪ i),
∆S∪iv(T ) = ∆i(∆Sv(T )) = ∆
xS
0S
U(xT∪i, 0−T∪i)−∆
xS
0S
U(xT , 0−T ) = 0
by assumption of p-additivity of U . Letting T = ∅, it follows that v is p-additive too (in
the sense of capacities), hence we can write:
U(x) = v(N) =
∑
S⊆N,0<|S|≤p
mv(S)
with mv(S) = ∆Sv(∅) = ∆
xS
0S
U(0). Since the latter term only depends on the variables
xS, the desired result follows.
3.3 p-additive k-ary capacities
By analogy with classical capacities, a k-ary capacity v is said to be (at most) p-additive
if mv(z) = 0 whenever |supp(z)| > p, where
supp(z) = {i ∈ N | zi > 0}.
Lemma 1. Let k ∈ N and p ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A k-ary game v is p-additive if and only if it
has the form
v(z) =
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
vx(x ∧ z) (z ∈ L
N ) (5)
where vx : L
N → R with vx(0) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that v is p-additive. By the decomposition of v in the basis of unanimity
games, it follows that
v =
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
mv(x)ux,
7
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hence we have the required form with vx = m
v(x)ux. Conversely, again by decomposition
in the basis of unanimity games and since vx is a game, (5) can be rewritten as:∑
y∈LN
mv(y)uy(z) =
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
∑
y∈LN
mvx(y)uy(x ∧ z)
=
∑
y∈LN ,0<|supp(y)|≤p
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
mvx(y)uy(x ∧ z)
=
∑
y∈LN ,0<|supp(y)|≤p
( ∑
x≥y,0<|supp(x)|≤p
mvx(y)
)
uy(z).
By uniqueness of the decomposition, it follows that v is p-additive.
Note that even if v is a capacity, the vx are not necessarily capacities.
It follows from Theorem 1 and the above result that the set of p-additive discrete GAI
models on X coincides with the set of (at most) p-additive k-ary capacities.
4 Monotone decomposition of a 2-additive GAI model
4.1 A complexity problem
In general, given a GAI model U on X under the form (1), its decomposition is not
unique. For example, with two attributes,
U(x1, x2) = 2x1 + x2 −max(x1, x2) (x ∈ R
2
+)
is equivalent to
U(x1, x2) = x1 +min(x1, x2) (x ∈ R
2
+)
Observe that in the second expression, all terms are nonnegative and monotone nonde-
creasing. Then the following question arises: Given a GAI model, is it always possible
to get a decomposition into nonnegative nondecreasing terms? The main result of this
paper will give a positive answer to this question, in the case of 2-additive GAI models.
This case is of particular importance in practice, since it constitutes a good compromise
between versatility and complexity. Experimental studies in multicriteria evaluation have
shown that 2-additive capacities have almost the same approximation ability than general
capacities (see, e.g., Grabisch et al. (2002)). A two-additive GAI model is considered in
Bigot et al. (2012), and a very similar model is deﬁned in Greco et al. (2014).
Before stating and proving the result, we explain why it is important to solve this
problem, which is related to the complexity of the model.
We begin by computing the number of unknowns in a 2-additive GAI model equivalent
to a k-ary capacity. By Theorem 1, such a model has the form (1) with S being the set
of singletons and pairs. Since |L| = k + 1, this yields
(k + 1)
(
n
1
)
+ (k + 1)2
(
n
2
)
=
n(k + 1)
2
(
2 + (k + 1)(n− 1)
)
8
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unknowns. U being monotone nondecreasing, this induces a number of monotonicity
constraints on the unknowns, of the type
U(aj11 , . . . , a
ji−1
i−1 , a
ji+1
i , a
ji+1
i+1 , . . . , a
jn
n ) ≥ U(a
j1
1 , . . . , a
ji−1
i−1 , a
ji
i , a
ji+1
i+1 , . . . , a
jn
n ) (6)
for every i ∈ N , j1 ∈ {0, . . . , m1}, . . . , ji−1 ∈ {0, . . . , mi−1}, ji ∈ {0, . . . , mi − 1}, ji+1 ∈
{0, . . . , mi+1},. . . ,jn ∈ {0, . . . , mn}. The number of elementary conditions contained in
(6) is equal to ∑
i∈N
(
mi ×
∏
j∈N\{i}
(mj + 1)
)
.
In the case where mi = k for every i, this number becomes
n× k × (k + 1)n−1.
Although the number of variables was still quadratic in n and k, the number of constraints
is exponential in n. It follows that any practical identiﬁcation of a GAI model based on
some optimization procedure2, where the variables are the unknowns of the GAI model
and the constraints are the monotonicity constraints (6) plus possibly some learning data,
has to cope with an exponential number of constraints. The following tables, obtained
with k = 4, shows that the underlying optimization problem becomes rapidly intractable.
n 4 6 8 10
♯ of variables 170 405 740 1175
♯ of constraints 2000 75 000 2 500 000 78 125 000
n 12 14 20
♯ of variables 1710 2345 4850
♯ of constraints 2 343 750 000 68 359 375 000 1.526E + 15
However, if a decomposition into nonnegative nondecreasing terms is possible, one has
only to check monotonicity of each term. Then the number of monotonicity conditions
drops to ∑
i∈N
mi +
∑
{i,j}⊆N
(
mi(mj + 1) +mj(mi + 1)
)
.
In the case where mi = k for every i, this number becomes
n× k ×
[
(n− 1)(k + 1) + 1
]
,
which is quadratic in n. The following table (k = 4) shows that the optimization problem
becomes tractable even for a large number of attributes.
n 4 6 8 10 12 14 20
♯ of constraints with
monotone decomposition
256 624 1152 1840 2688 3696 7680
2The learning problem can be classically transformed into a linear program, where the training set
is seen as linear constraints on the GAI variables (Bigot et al., 2012; Greco et al., 2014). It could also
be possible to perform statistical learning, like in Fallah Tehrani et al. (2012), where the underlying
optimization problem is a convex problem under linear constraints.
9
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4.2 The main result
The following theorem states that a decomposition of a 2-additive GAI model into mono-
tone nondecreasing terms is always possible.
Theorem 2. Let us consider a 2-additive discrete GAI model U satisfying assumptions 1
and 2. Then there exist nonnegative and nondecreasing functions ui : Xi → [0, 1], i ∈ N ,
uij : Xi ×Xj → [0, 1], {i, j} ⊆ N , such that
U(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(xi) +
∑
{i,j}⊆N
uij(xi, xj) (x ∈ X)
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem, which goes through a
number of intermediary results. First, we remark that the problem is equivalent to the
decomposition of a 2-additive k-ary capacity v into a sum of 2-additive k-ary capacities
whose support has size at most 2, where the support of v is deﬁned by
supp(v) =
⋃
x∈LN :mv(x)6=0
supp(x).
We consider Pk,· the polytope of k-ary capacities, and Pk,2 the polytope of 2-additive
k-ary capacities. Our aim is to study the vertices of the latter, and we will show that
these vertices are the adequate k-ary capacities to perform the decomposition.
A ﬁrst easy fact is that the extreme points of Pk,· are the 0-1-valued k-ary capacities.
Lemma 2. vˆ is an extreme point of Pk,· iﬀ vˆ is 0-1-valued.
Proof. Take vˆ in Pk,· which is 0-1-valued, and consider v, v
′ ∈ Pk,· such that
v+v′
2
= vˆ.
Then, since vˆ is 0-1-valued,
v(x) + v′(x) =
{
2, if vˆ(x) = 1
0, otherwise.
Since v, v′ are normalized and monotone, the only possibility to get v(x)+ v′(x) = 2 is to
have v(x) = v′(x) = 1, and similarly, v(x) + v′(x) = 0 forces v(x) = v′(x) = 0. It follows
that v = v′ = vˆ, i.e., vˆ is an extreme point of Pk,·.
Conversely, consider a vertex vˆ which is not 0-1-valued, and let
ǫ = min(1− max
x:vˆ(x)<1
vˆ(x), min
x:vˆ(x)>0
vˆ(x)).
Deﬁne
v′(x) = vˆ(x) + ǫ, for all x s.t. vˆ(x) 6= 0, 1
v′′(x) = vˆ(x)− ǫ, for all x s.t. vˆ(x) 6= 0, 1,
and v′ = v′′ = vˆ otherwise. Then v′, v′′ ∈ Pk,· and vˆ =
v′+v′′
2
, a contradiction.
Lemma 3. Let k ∈ N and v ∈ Pk,2. Then v is 0-1-valued iﬀ m
v is {−1, 0, 1} valued.
10
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Proof. ⇐) By the assumption
∑
y≤xm
v(y) ∈ Z for every x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N . Since
v ∈ Pk,2 it follows that v is 0-1-valued.
⇒) Assume v is 0-1-valued and use (4) to compute the Mo¨bius transform. For z = ℓi
with ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have mv(z) = v(ℓi)− v((ℓ− 1)i), so that the desired result holds.
Otherwise z = ℓiℓ
′
j with ℓ, ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and distinct i, j ∈ N . Then
mv(z) = v(z)− v((ℓ− 1)iℓ
′
j)− v(ℓi(ℓ
′ − 1)j) + v((ℓ− 1)i(ℓ
′ − 1)j). (7)
By the assumption and monotonicity of v, it follows that mv(z) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
We recall that a m × n matrix is totally unimodular if the determinant of every
square submatrix is equal to −1, 0 or 1. A polyhedron is integer if all its extreme points
have integer coordinates. Then a matrix A is totally unimodular iﬀ the polyhedron
{x | Ax ≤ b} is integer for every integer vector b. In particular it is known that the
vertex-arc matrix M of a directed graph, i.e., whose entries are Mx,a = 1 if the arc a
leaves vertex x, −1 if a enters x, and 0 otherwise, is totally unimodular (in other words,
each column of M has exactly one +1 and one −1, the rest being 0).
We are now in position to characterize the extreme points of Pk,2.
Theorem 3. Let k ∈ N. The set of extreme points of Pk,2, the polytope of 2-additive
k-ary capacities, is the set of 0-1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacities.
Proof. By Lemma 2, we need only to prove that any extreme point of Pk,2 is 0-1-valued.
1. We prove that Ak,·, the matrix deﬁning the polytope of k-ary capacities, is totally
unimodular. The argument follows the one given for classical capacities by Miranda et
al. (Miranda et al., 2006, Th. 2). We prove that A⊤k,· is totally unimodular, which is
equivalent to the desired result. Since the monotonicity constraints are either of the form
v(1i) ≥ 0 or v(x) − v(x
′) ≥ 0 where x′ is a lower neighbor of x (i.e. x′ = x − 1i for
some i), the matrix A⊤k.· has the form (I, B), where I is a submatrix of the (k
n − 1)-dim
identity matrix Ikn−1, and B is a matrix where each column has exactly one +1 and one
−1. Hence B is totally unimodular, and so is (Ikn−1, B) as it easy to check. Since A
⊤
k,· is
a submatrix of it, it is also totally unimodular.
2. It follows from Step 1 that the polytope Pk,·(b) given by Ak,·v ≤ b is integer for
every integer vector b. Next, consider the (kn−1)×(kn−1)-matrix Z expressing the Zeta
transform, i.e., Zmv = v, as given by (3). This matrix has only 0 and 1 as entries, and
its inverse Z−1 exists and its entries are 0,−1,+1 only (see (4)). Consider the polytope
Pmk,·(b) given by A
m
k,·m ≤ b with A
m
k,· = Ak,·Z, the image by the linear transform Z of the
polytope Pk,·(b). It is easy to check that vˆ is an extreme point of Pk,·(b) iﬀ Z
−1vˆ is an
extreme point of Pmk,·(b). Evidently, the coordinates of Z
−1vˆ are integer, therefore Pmk,·(b)
is integer for every integer vector b. We conclude that Amk,· is totally unimodular.
3. Inasmuch as a submatrix of a totally unimodular matrix is itself totally unimodular,
it follows from Step 2 that Amk,2, the matrix deﬁning the set of 2-additive k-ary capacities
in Mo¨bius coordinates, is also totally unimodular. As a conclusion, the extreme points
of Pmk,2 are integer-valued.
4. We show that the extreme points of Pmk,2 are {−1, 0, 1}-valued. Then Lemma 3
permits to conclude. It suﬃces to show that |mv(z)| ≥ 2 cannot happen. If z = ℓi with
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we ﬁnd by (4) that mv(z) = v(ℓi) − v((ℓ − 1)i), so that the claim holds
since v ∈ Pk,2. Otherwise, z = ℓiℓ
′
j with ℓ, ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and distinct i, j, and mv(z) is
given by (7). Since v is monotone and normalized, the claim easily follows.
11
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The last step is to prove that a 0-1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacity has a support of
size at most 2.
Theorem 4. Consider a 2-additive k-ary capacity u on N which is 0-1-valued. Then the
support of u is restricted to at most two attributes.
Proof. Preliminary Step. u being 2-additive, its expression is
u(x) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N
ui,j(xi, xj) (x ∈ X). (8)
If we set u′i,j(xi, xj) = ui,j(xi, xj) − ui,j(0, 0), we obtain u(x) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N u
′
i,j(xi, xj) + C,
where C = −
∑
{i,j}⊆N ui,j(0, 0). By assumption 2 and u
′
i,j(0, 0) = 0, one gets C = 0.
This proves that in decomposition (8), one can always assume that
∀{i, j} ⊆ N ui,j(0, 0) = 0. (9)
We wish to prove that u depends only on one term ui,j in (8). In order to avoid cases
where such a term ui,j depends only on one variable (in which case u might also depend
on another term uk,l), we are interested in terms ui,j depending on its two variables xi
and xj . We say that ui,j depends on its two variables if
∃yi ∈ Xi ∃yj ∈ Xj ui,j(yi, yj) 6= ui,j(yi, 0) (10)
∃y′i ∈ Xi ∃y
′
j ∈ Xj ui,j(y
′
i, y
′
j) 6= ui,j(0, y
′
j) (11)
Clearly, if (10) (resp. (11)) is not fulﬁlled, then ui,j does not depend on attribute xj
(resp. xi).
The proof is organized as follows. We show in Step 1 that if there is no term ui,j that
depends on its two variables, then u depends only on one variable. We then assume that
at least one term ui,j depends on its two variables – denoted u1,2 w.l.o.g. Step 2 shows
that it is not possible to have a non-zero term ui,j, with {i, j} ⊆ N \{1, 2}. Step 3 proves
that it is not possible to have a non-zero term ui,j, with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N \ {1, 2}.
We conclude that u1,2 is the only non-zero term in the decomposition. This proves that
u depends only on two variables.
Step 1: case of the additive utility model. We ﬁrst start with the case where
there is no term ui,j that depends on its two variables.
Lemma 4. Assume that there is no term ui,j that depends on its two variables. Then
the support of u is restricted to one attribute.
Proof. If there is no term ui,j that depends on its two variables, u takes the form of an
additive utility:
u(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(xi)
where ui : Xi → R is not necessarily non-negative or monotone. By (9), we have ui(0) = 0
for every i ∈ N .
Let i ∈ N , we write u(xi, 0−i) = ui(xi). Hence ui is 0-1-valued and monotone.
12
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.64
As u is not constant by Assumption 2, at least one term ui is not constant. W.l.o.g.
let us assume it is u1. Then there exists x1 ∈ X1 such that u1(x1) = 1.
Now for every i ∈ N \ {1} and xi ∈ Xi, u(x1, xi, 0−1,i) = 1 + ui(xi). As ui is non-
negative and u is 0-1-valued, we conclude that ui(xi) = 0. Hence u depends only on
x1.
Step 2: Case where u has two non-zero terms with non-overlapping sup-
port, e.g., u1,2 and u3,4. We now focus on the situation where at least one term ui,j
depends on its two variables. W.l.o.g., we assume it is u1,2.
We consider the general case where there are at least 4 attributes. The restriction
with only 3 attributes will be handled in Step 3. For every j ∈ N \ {1, 2}, we choose
k(j) ∈ N \{1, 2, j} (where k(j) 6= k(j′) for j 6= j′). For every i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N \{1, 2},
we set
u′i,j(xi, xj) = ui,j(xi, xj)− ui,j(xi, 0)− ui,j(0, xj)
u′1,2(x1, x2) = u1,2(x1, x2) +
∑
j∈N\{1,2}
(u1,j(x1, 0) + u2,j(x2, 0))
u′j,k(j)(xj, xk(j)) = uj,k(j)(xj , xk(j)) + u1,j(0, xj) + u2,j(0, xj)
Then u(x) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N u
′
i,j(xi, xj). Moreover u
′
i,j(xi, 0) = 0 and u
′
i,j(0, xj) = 0 for i ∈
{1, 2}, j ∈ N \ {1, 2}, xi ∈ Xi and xj ∈ Xj . Hence in decomposition (8), we can assume
that
∀i ∈ {1, 2} ∀j ∈ N \{1, 2} ∀xi ∈ Xi ∀xj ∈ Xj ui,j(xi, 0) = 0 and ui,j(0, xj) = 0. (12)
Thanks to (9) and (12), we have
u(x1, x2, 0−1,2) = u1,2(x1, x2) (13)
Hence
u1,2 is 0-1-valued and monotone. (14)
By (14), conditions (10) and (11) with i = 1, j = 2 give
u1,2(y1, y2) = 1 , u1,2(y1, 0) = 0
u1,2(y
′
1, y
′
2) = 1 , u1,2(0, y
′
2) = 0
(15)
Assume by contradiction that there exists a non-zero ui,j for some {i, j} ⊆ N \
{1, 2}. W.l.o.g., we assume it is u3,4. Then there exists z3 ∈ X3 and z4 ∈ X4 such that
u3,4(z3, z4) 6= 0. As for (12), we can transfer, for i ∈ {3, 4} and j ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the
term ui,j(xi, 0) in u3,4. Hence we can assume that
∀i ∈ {3, 4} ∀j ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3, 4} ∀xi ∈ Xi ui,j(xi, 0) = 0. (16)
Thanks to (9), (12) and (16), we have
u(x3, x4, 0−3,4) = u3,4(x3, x4) (17)
Hence
u3,4 is 0-1-valued, monotone, and u3,4(z3, z4) = 1. (18)
13
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Lemma 5. If u1,2 depends on its two variables, then u3,4 is identically zero.
Proof. We set v(x1, x2, x3, x4) = u(x1, x2, x3, x4, 0−1,2,3,4). We write
v(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
∑
1≤i<j≤4
ui,j(xi, xj).
Analysis with y and z:
• v(y1, y2, z3, z4) = u1,2(y1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u3,4(z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
∑
i∈{1,2},j∈{3,4} ui,j(yi, zj). We have v(y1, y2, z3, z4) =
1 as v(y1, y2, z3, z4) ≥ v(y1, y2, 0, 0) = u1,2(y1, y2) = 1. Hence∑
i∈{1,2},j∈{3,4}
ui,j(yi, zj) = −1. (19)
• v(y1, y2, z3, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= 1 + u3,4(z3, 0) + u1,3(y1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3). Hence
u3,4(z3, 0) + u1,3(y1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) = 0. (20)
• v(y1, y2, 0, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= 1 + u3,4(0, z4) + u1,4(y1, z4) + u2,4(y2, z4). Hence
u3,4(0, z4) + u1,4(y1, z4) + u2,4(y2, z4) = 0. (21)
• v(y1, 0, z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= u1,2(y1, 0)+1+u1,3(y1, z3)+u1,4(y1, z4). Moreover, u1,2(y1, 0) = 0
by (15). Hence
u1,3(y1, z3) + u1,4(y1, z4) = 0. (22)
• v(0, y2, z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= u1,2(0, y2) + 1 + u2,3(y2, z3) + u2,4(y2, z4). Hence
u1,2(0, y2) + u2,3(y2, z3) + u2,4(y2, z4) = 0. (23)
• From (22), (23) and (19),
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. (24)
• v(0, y2, z3, 0) = u1,2(0, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by (24)
+u3,4(z3, 0)+u2,3(y2, z3). Moreover, v(0, y2, z3, 0) ≥ v(0, y2, 0, 0) =
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. Hence
u3,4(z3, 0) + u2,3(y2, z3) = 0 and u2,3(y2, z3) ∈ {−1, 0}. (25)
• v(0, y2, 0, z4) = 1+u3,4(0, z4)+u2,4(y2, z4). Moreover, v(0, y2, 0, z4) ≥ v(0, y2, 0, 0) =
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. Hence
u3,4(0, z4) + u2,4(y2, z4) = 0 and u2,4(y2, z4) ∈ {−1, 0}. (26)
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.64
From (19) and (22), we get u2,3(y2, z3)+u2,4(y2, z4) = −1. As u2,3(y2, z3), u2,4(y2, z4) ∈
{−1, 0} (by (25) and (26)), we have two cases:
• Case 1: u2,3(y2, z3) = −1 and u2,4(y2, z4) = 0. Then
u3,4(z3, 0) = 1 by (25)
u1,3(y1, z3) = 0 by (20)
u1,4(y1, z4) = 0 by (22)
u1,2(y1, 0) = 0 by (15)
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 by (24)
u3,4(0, z4) = 0 by (26)
All values are determined.
• Case 2: u2,3(y2, z3) = 0 and u2,4(y2, z4) = −1. Then
u3,4(0, z4) = 1 by (26)
u3,4(z3, 0) = 0 by (25)
u1,3(y1, z3) = 0 by (20)
u1,4(y1, z4) = 0 by (21)
u1,2(y1, 0) = 0 by (15)
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 by (24)
All values are determined.
Analysis with y′ and z: The analyses with y and z, and with y′ and z are similar. By
(15), we just need to invert the two attributes 1 and 2. Hence a similar reasoning to the
previous analysis can be done. We obtain thus the two cases 1′ and 2′ which are deduced
from cases 1 and 2 just by switching attributes 1 and 2:
• Case 1’:
u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = −1
u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = 0
u3,4(z3, 0) = 1
u2,3(y
′
2, z3) = 0
u2,4(y
′
2, z4) = 0
u1,2(y
′
1, 0) = 1
u1,2(0, y
′
2) = 0
u3,4(0, z4) = 0
15
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• Case 2’:
u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = 0
u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = −1
u3,4(0, z4) = 1
u3,4(z3, 0) = 0
u2,3(y
′
2, z3) = 0
u2,4(y
′
2, z4) = 0
u1,2(y
′
1, 0) = 1
u1,2(0, y
′
2) = 0
Synthesis: Cases 1 and 2’ are incompatible, and so are cases 2 and 1’. We have thus the
alternative:
• Case 1 and 1’. Gathering the values of partial utilities, we get
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = 0 u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = −1
u2,3(y2, z3) = −1 u2,4(y2, z4) = 0
As u1,2(y
′
1, y2) ≥ u1,2(0, y2) = 1, we have u1,2(y
′
1, y2) = 1. Hence
u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) = u1,2(y
′
1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u3,4(z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u1,3(y
′
1, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
+ u1,4(y
′
1, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ u2,3(y2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
+ u2,4(y2, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0
We obtain a contradiction as u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) ≥ u(0, 0, z3, z4) = 1.
• Case 2 and 2’. Gathering the values of partial utilities, we get
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = −1 u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = 0
u2,3(y2, z3) = 0 u2,4(y2, z4) = −1
As u1,2(y
′
1, y2) ≥ u1,2(0, y2) = 1, we have u1,2(y
′
1, y2) = 1. Hence
u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) = u1,2(y
′
1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u3,4(z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u1,3(y
′
1, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ u1,4(y
′
1, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
+ u2,3(y2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ u2,4(y2, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
= 0
We obtain a contradiction as u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) ≥ u(0, 0, z3, z4) = 1.
A contradiction is raised in all situations. Hence it is not possible to have u3,4 non-zero,
knowing that u1,2 depends on its two variables.
16
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Step 3: Case where u has two non-zero terms with overlapping support,
e.g., u1,2 and u1,3. In the last case, term u1,2 depends on its two variables, and there is
no non-zero term ui,j, with i, j 6= 1, 2, that depends on its two variables.
We proceed as in the beginning of Step 2, assuming that
∀i ∈ {1, 2} ∀j ∈ N \ {1, 2} ∀xi ∈ Xi ui,j(xi, 0) = 0. (27)
Then relations (13) through (15) also hold in this case.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a non-zero ui,j for some i ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ N \ {1, 2}. Wlog, we assume it is u1,3. There exists thus z1 ∈ X1 and z3 ∈ X3 such
that
u1,3(z1, z3) 6= 0. (28)
One can transfer term ui,3(0, x3), for i 6= 1, 3, to u1,3 (proceeding as in the beginning of
Step 2). Hence we can assume that
∀i ∈ N \ {1, 3} ∀x3 ∈ X3 ui,3(0, x3) = 0. (29)
Lemma 6. If u1,2 depends on its two variables, then u1,3 is identically zero.
Proof. We set v(x1, x2, x3) = u(x1, x2, x3, 0−1,2,3). Then
v(x1, x2, x3) = u1,2(x1, x2) + u1,3(x1, x3) + u2,3(x2, x3).
Analysis with y and z: We write thanks to (13) and to the monotonicity of v
v(z1, 0, z3) = u1,2(z1, 0) + u1,3(z1, z3)
≥ v(z1, 0, 0) = u1,2(z1, 0)
Hence u1,3(z1, z3) ≥ 0, which gives by (28)
u1,3(z1, z3) = 1 (30)
u1,2(z1, 0) = 0 (31)
We have the following basic relations:
v(y1, 0, z3) = u1,2(y1, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+u1,3(y1, z3) (32)
v(y1, y2, z3) = 1 + u1,3(y1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) (33)
v(z1, y2, z3) = u1,2(z1, y2) + u1,3(z1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) (34)
Analysis with compound alternatives: We distinguish between two cases:
• Assume ﬁrst that z1 ≥ y1. By (14) and (15), we have
u1,2(z1, y2) = 1. (35)
By monotonicity, v(z1, y2, z3) = 1 (as v(z1, 0, z3) = u1,2(z1, 0)+1 and thus v(z1, 0, z3) =
1). Hence (30) and (34) give
u2,3(y2, z3) = −1. (36)
By monotonicity, v(y1, y2, z3) = 1 (as v(y1, y2, 0) = u1,2(y1, y2) = 1). From (33) and
previous relation, we have
u1,3(y1, z3) = 1. (37)
17
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• Assume then that z1 < y1. We have v(y1, 0, z3) = 1 by monotonicity of v (as
v(z1, 0, z3) = 1). Then (32) proves that (37) holds. This implies that (36) also
holds, thanks to (33).
By monotonicity, v(z1, y2, z3) = 1 (as v(z1, 0, z3) = 1). Hence (34) and (36) show
that (35) is satisﬁed.
In the two cases, we have proved that relations (35), (36) and (37) are true.
We make the following reasoning.
• We write
v(0, y2, z3) = u1,2(0, y2) + u1,3(0, z3)− 1
≥ v(0, y2, 0) = u1,2(0, y2)
Therefore u1,3(0, z3) ≥ 1. We also see that u1,3(0, z3) ∈ {0, 1} as v(0, 0, z3) =
u1,3(0, z3). Hence
u1,3(0, z3) = 1 (38)
v(0, 0, z3) = 1 (39)
• We write
v(0, y2, z3) = u1,2(0, y2) + u1,3(0, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) = u1,2(0, y2)
≥ v(0, 0, z3) = 1
Hence
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. (40)
• We have
v(0, y′2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity and (39)
= u1,3(0, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+u2,3(y
′
2, z3)
Hence
u2,3(y
′
2, z3) = 0. (41)
• We have
v(y′1, y
′
2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= 1 + u1,3(y
′
1, z3) + u2,3(y
′
2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (41)
Hence
u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = 0. (42)
• Finally
v(y′1, y2, z3) = u1,2(y
′
1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by (14) and (40)
+ u1,3(y
′
1, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (42)
+ u2,3(y2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1 by (36)
= 0
We obtain a contradiction as v(y′1, y2, z3) = 1 (thanks to monotonicity of v, and to
(39)).
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A contradiction is raised in all situations. Hence it is not possible to have u1,3 non-zero,
knowing that u1,2 depends on its two variables.
Finally, we have proved that if u1,2 depends on its two variables, no other term can
be non-zero. This proves that u depends only on two variables.
In summary, we have proved that the extreme points of Pk,2 are the 2-additive 0-1-
valued k-ary capacities, and that these capacities have a support of size at most 2. It
follows that any v ∈ Pk,2 can be written as a convex combination of 2-additive k-ary
capacities with support of size at most 2, which proves Theorem 2.
4.3 Expression of the extreme points of the polytope of 2-
additive k-ary capacities
We are now in position to determine all vertices of Pk,2, for a ﬁxed k ∈ N. By Theorem 4,
we know that any vertex has a support of at most two elements, hence w.l.o.g. we can
restrict to elements 1 and 2. By Theorem 3, ﬁnding all vertices with support {1, 2}
amounts to ﬁnding all 0-1 k-ary capacities which are linear combinations of unanimity
games ux with supp(x) ⊆ {1, 2}. By analogy with classical simple games, a coalition
x ∈ LN is winning for v if v(x) = 1. Minimal winning coalitions are those which are
minimal w.r.t. the order ≤ on LN , and therefore they form an antichain in LN . We show
several properties of minimal winning coalitions.
Lemma 7. Let µ be a 0-1-valued k-ary capacity.
(i) x is a minimal winning coalition if and only if mµ(x) = 1 and mµ(y) = 0 for all
y < x.
(ii) supp(µ) ⊆ {1, 2} if and only if its minimal winning coalitions have support included
in {1, 2}.
(iii) If |supp(µ)| = 2, there are at most k + 1 distinct minimal winning coalitions.
(iv) Suppose that supp(µ) ⊆ {1, 2}. Denote by x1, . . . , xq the minimal winning coalitions
of µ, arranged such that x11 < x
2
1 · · · < x
q
1. Then m
µ(xℓ) = 1 for all ℓ = 1, . . . , q,
mµ(xℓ ∨ xℓ+1) = −1 for ℓ = 1, . . . , q − 1, and mµ(x) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. (i) Suppose mµ(x) = 1 and mµ(y) = 0 for all y < x. Then clearly x is a
minimal winning coalition. Conversely, suppose ﬁrst that there exists y < x such
that mµ(y) 6= 0, and choose a minimal y with this property. Then µ(y) 6= 0,
a contradiction. Then, suppose there is no such y < x but mµ(x) 6= 1. Then
µ(x) = mµ(x) 6= 1, again a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose there exists a minimal winning coalition x such that supp(x) 6⊆ {1, 2}.
Then by (i), the support of µ is not included in {1, 2}.
Conversely, suppose that there exists x ∈ LN with mµ(x) 6= 0 and supp(x) 6⊆ {1, 2}.
Choose a minimal such x. By Lemma 3, mµ(x) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Observe that mµ(x) =
−1 is impossible, because this would yield µ(x) = −1. Then mµ(x) = 1 = µ(x),
proving by (i) that x is a minimal winning coalition.
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(iii) Take x being a minimal winning coalition, and suppose w.l.o.g. that supp(x) ⊆
{1, 2}. Observe that any other minimal winning coalition y must satisfy x1 6= y1,
otherwise one of the two would not be minimal. Hence, there can be at most k+ 1
distinct minimal winning coalitions.
(iv) By uniqueness of the decomposition, it suﬃces to check that the computation of
µ by µ(x) =
∑
y≤xm
µ(y) works. By construction, any x ∈ LN is greater or equal
to a subset of consecutive minimal winning coalitions, say, xi+1, xi+2, . . . , xi+j , so
that there are j − 1 pairs (xi+ℓ, xi+ℓ+1), ℓ = 1, . . . , j − 1. The result follows by the
deﬁnition of mµ.
The various properties in the Lemma permit to say that the vertices of Pk,2 with
support included into {1, 2} are in bijection with the antichains (which are of size at
most k + 1) in the lattice (k + 1)2. Moreover, their Mo¨bius transform is known.
Lemma 8. Let k ∈ N. Denote by κ(ℓ) the number of antichains of ℓ elements in the
lattice (k + 1)2, ℓ = 1, . . . , k + 1. Then
κ(ℓ) =
(
k + 1
ℓ
)2
.
Moreover, the total number of antichains on (k + 1)2 is
k+1∑
ℓ=1
κ(ℓ) =
(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 1.
Proof. Let x ∈ (k + 1)2, with coordinates (x1, x2). Considering that the 1st coordinate
axis is on the left, we say that y is on the left of x if y1 > x1 and y2 < x2. Let us denote
by F1(x1, x2) the number of points y to the left of x (i.e., {x, y} is an antichain). We
obtain
F1(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=0
k∑
y1=x1+1
1 = x2(k − x1).
Note that κ(1) = F1(−1, k + 1) since any point in (k + 1)
2 is to the left of (−1, k + 1).
Deﬁne F2(x1, x2) as the number of antichains {y, z} to the left of x, with z to the left
of y, i.e., {x, y, z} forms an antichain. We obtain
F2(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=1
k−1∑
y1=x1+1
F1(y1, y2).
(note that y2 = 0 and y1 = k are impossible because z is on the left of y). Again remark
that κ(2) = F2(−1, k+ 1). More generally, the number of antichains of ℓ elements to the
left of x is
Fℓ(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ−1
k−ℓ+1∑
y1=x1+1
Fℓ−1(y1, y2) (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k + 1),
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and κ(ℓ) = Fℓ(−1, k + 1). We show by induction that
Fℓ(x1, x2) =
(
x2
ℓ
)(
k − x1
ℓ
)
. (43)
The result has already been veriﬁed for ℓ = 1. We assume it is true up to some integer
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k and prove it for ℓ+ 1. We have
Fℓ+1(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ
k−ℓ∑
y1=x1+1
Fℓ(y1, y2)
=
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ
k−ℓ∑
y1=x1+1
(
y2
ℓ
)(
k − y1
ℓ
)
=
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ
(
y2
ℓ
) k−ℓ∑
y1=x1+1
(
k − y1
ℓ
)
=
(
x2
ℓ+ 1
)(
k − x1
ℓ+ 1
)
,
where we have used the fact that (see (Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 2007, §0.151))
m∑
k=0
(
n+ k
n
)
=
(
n+m+ 1
n+ 1
)
.
Hence (43) is proved. It remains to compute the total number of antichains. Using the
fact that (see (Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 2007, §0.157))
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)2
=
(
2n
n
)
,
we ﬁnd the desired result.
Observing that the antichain {0} does not correspond to a normalized capacity, we
obtain directly from Lemma 8 and previous considerations the following result.
Theorem 5. Let k ∈ N and consider the polytope Pk,2. The following holds.
(i) For any i ∈ N , the number of vertices with support {i} is k.
(ii) For any distinct i, j ∈ N , the number of vertices with support included in {i, j} is(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2.
(iii) The total number of vertices of Pk,2 is[(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2− 2k
]
n(n− 1)
2
+ kn =
[(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2
]
n(n− 1)
2
− kn(n− 2).
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5 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that it is always possible to write a 2-additive discrete
GAI model as a sum of nonnegative and monotone nondecreasing terms, thus reducing
the complexity of any optimization problem involving such models from exponential to
quadratic complexity in the number of attributes. We believe that this result opens the
way to the practical utilization of GAI models.
By the equivalence between 2-additive discrete GAI models and 2-additive k-ary ca-
pacities, as a by-product of our main result, we have obtained all extreme points of the
polytope of 2-additive k-ary capacities, a result which is new, as far as we know, and
which generalizes the results of Miranda et al. (2006) for classical 2-additive capacities.
Appendix: Mo¨bius transform of a k-ary capacity
The result can be easily obtained by using standard results of the theory of Mo¨bius
functions (see, e.g., Aigner (1979)). Given a ﬁnite poset (partially ordered set) (P,≤),
its Mo¨bius function µ : P × P → R is deﬁned inductively by:
µ(x, y) =


1, if x = y
−
∑
x≤t<y µ(x, t), if x < y
0, otherwise
.
Then the solution of the system f(x) =
∑
y≤x g(y), x ∈ P , is given by
g(x) =
∑
y≤x
µ(y, x)f(y) (x ∈ P ),
and g is called the Mo¨bius transform (or inverse) of f . Note that in the case of capacities,
(P,≤) is taken as (2N ,⊆).
Considering two posets (P,≤), (P ′,≤′), and the product poset (P × P ′,≤) where ≤
is the product order, i.e., (x, y) ≤ (x′, y′) if x ≤ x′ and y ≤′ y′, it is easy to show that the
Mo¨bius function on P × P ′ is the product of the Mo¨bius functions on P and P ′:
µ((x, t), (y, z)) = µP (x, y)µP ′(t, z) (x, y ∈ P, t, z ∈ P
′).
Let us apply this result to k-ary capacities. It is easy to see that the Mo¨bius function on
the chain {0, 1, . . . , k} is given by
µ{0,1,...,k}(x, y) =
{
(−1)y−x, if 0 ≤ y − x ≤ 1
0, otherwise.
(44)
It follows that the Mo¨bius transform mv of a k-ary capacity v is given by
mv(x) =
∑
y≤x:xi−yi≤1∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N (xi−yi)v(y).
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